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INTRODUCTION
The exceptional importance of the congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce is widely acknowledged. 2 The Commerce Clause
authorizes, or is claimed to authorize, a remarkable range, in particular, of
criminal prosecutions. One court of appeals case 3 listed an actual or
purported Commerce Clause basis for federal criminal statutes focusing on,
respectively, animal terrorism,4  avoiding payment of child support,'
avoiding prosecution,6 transportation of strikebreakers, murder for hire,8
*. Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. See, e.g., EDWARD SAMUEL CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 67
(14th ed. 1978) ("The Commerce Clause comprises ... the direct source of the most important peace-
time powers of the National Government...."); STEVEND. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE
OF REASON 51, 59 (1998); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW'S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW'S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 38, 41 (2016); Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce
Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 167, 167 (2014) ("[T]he Commerce Clause ... in its New Deal
incarnation expanded the powers of the federal government far beyond any level that it had previously
held."); Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious Enumerated Power Doctrine, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 25, 30
(2005) ("In the last seventy years, an explosive expansion of the power to regulate commerce ... has
found a wide range of appropriately national activities to be legitimate."); John Paul Stevens, Should We
Have a New Constitutional Convention?, N.Y. REV. (Oct. 11, 2012), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/
2012/10/11/should-we-have-new-constitutional-convention [https://perma.cc/Y56K-FZ87] (referring to
"[t]he central importance of the Commerce Clause"). The scope of the congressional interstate commerce
clause regulatory power is elaborately explored in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
196-254 (8th ed. 2018).
3. United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
4. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 43).
5. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 228).
6. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1073).
7. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1958).
8. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2101).
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causing a not,9 participating in a niot,10 robbery involving controlled
substances," domestic violence, 12 stalking, 13 violating a domestic protective
order,14 and providing minors for sex.15
To this listing we might add sex offender registration and notification
requirements, 16 biological weapons in the context of terrorism, 17 chemical
weapons prohibition,18 church arson prevention, 19 access to health clinic
entrances, 20 hate crimes prevention, 2 1 a broad federal arson statute, 2 2 a
felon's possession of a firearm, 2 3 brandishing of a firearm during a violent
crime, 2 4 Hobbs Acts robberies, 25 violent crimes in aid of a racketeering
enterpnse,26 and particular crimes associated with child pornography. 2 7
9. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2101).
10. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2102).
11. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2118).
12. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2261).
13. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A).
14. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2262).
15. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2423).
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 113, 2250, as discussed in United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1209-10
(11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 2009).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 178(2), as discussed in United States v. Le, 902 F.3d 104, 109-11 (2d Cir. 2018).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1), as discussed in Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 844 (2014)
(reversing the criminal conviction).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 247, as discussed in United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir.
2005) (en banc); United States v. Corum, 362 F.3d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Roof, 225
F. Supp. 3d 438, 452 (D.S.C. 2016).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(2), as discussed in Zhang Jinrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance,
314 F. Supp. 3d 420, 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 249 (a)(2), as discussedin United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 2019);
United States v. Beckham, No. 3:18-cr-00075-1 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111582, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. July
3, 2019); United States v. Mason, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1316 (D. Or. 2014); United States v. Jenkins,
909 F. Supp. 2d 763, 763 (E.D. Ky. 2012); United Statesv. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 (N.D. Ohio
2012) (recognizing that scissors and hair clippers used in an assault had moved in interstate commerce;
and that the postal system and motor vehicles were also used in connection with the assault in question).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), as discussed in United States v. Mahon, 804 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2015);
United States v. Laon, 352 F.3d 286, 288 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249, 1250
(9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Raybom, 312 F.3d 229, 231 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Rea, 300
F.3d 952, 959 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Odom, 252 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2001); United
Statesv. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10thCir. 2001); United Statesv. Dascenzo, 152 F.3d 1330, 1301
(IIth Cir. 1998).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(i), as discussed in United Statesv. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir.
2011); United Statesv. Urbano, 563 F.3d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 2009).
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 (c)(1)(A), 924(c)(1)(C), as discussed in United States v. Gillespie, 452 F.3d
1183, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1951, as discussed in United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902, 909 (9th Cir. 2006).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2), as discussed in United States v. Aquart, 912 F.3d 1, 17-18 (2d Cir.
2018); United States v. Ulmana, 750 F.3d 330, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d
179, 203 (2d Cir. 2008).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), as discussed in United States v. Humphrey, 845 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th
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For our purposes, the problem is whether a given federal statute, either
on its face, or as applied under the circumstances of a particular case, can
somehow be sufficiently linked to the legitimate scope of the underlying
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. We are thus concerned
with the scope and limits of the interstate commerce power. And our focus
is in particular on the many close, difficult, or controversial such cases.
Below, this Article introduces the relevant case law 2 8 by examining the
recent case of United States v. Hill,29 a federal Hate Crimes Prevention Act
prosecution of a battery committed on a gay fellow-employee at an Amazon
Fulfillment Center.3 0 There follows a brief tour of the most crucially relevant
Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence, with an emphasis on
current doctrine. 31
In light of these materials, this Article then highlights a number of
largely unsolvable problems in trying to delimit the scope of the Commerce
Clause power. There is, merely to begin, the problem of the vagueness of
legal language in general and of the key terms embodied in the Commerce
Clause more specifically. 3 2 The vagueness problem impairs attempts to
clarify the meaning and bounds of the language of the Commerce Clause. 3 3
These largely unsolvable problems of vagueness then afflict the courts'
attempts to rely on ideas such as a given activity somehow sufficiently
"affecting" interstate commerce, or being such as to sufficiently "concern"
interstate commerce. 34 Similarly unsatisfactory are the judicial attempts to
rely on a distinction between an entity's being sufficiently "active," or
actively engaged with respect to interstate commerce, as supposedly distinct
from being merely "passive," or insufficiently engaged with interstate
commerce. And then perhaps most deeply problematic is the standard
judicial reliance on the idea of sometimes "aggregating" small separate
effects on interstate commerce into a hypothetical or actual "substantial"
collective effect of those activities on interstate commerce.
Cir. 2017).
28. See infra Part I.
29. United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2019).
30. See id. at 193-94.
31. See infra Part II. For the Court's ongoing attempts to establish what should count as
'commercial' in the context of commercial speech as distinct from non-commercial speech, see, e.g., Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). A copy of even an intensely political book or newspaper, however,
is still commercial in the sense of commonly being an item intentionally moving in interstate commerce.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part IV.
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Given the insolubility of these problems, the Conclusion below
recommends instead drawing the boundary lines in close Commerce Clause
cases with a conscious regard for independently recognized fundamental
constitutional rights and, especially in these close cases, for the expressive
or symbolic value, or the lack thereof, of particular statutes and court
judgments.
I. HATE CRIMES LEGISLATION AND THE SCOPE OF THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE POWER: THE HILL CASE
In the recent case of United States v. Hill, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the scope of congressional power to punish bias-
motivated 3 5 crimes. 36 In this case, the defendant was charged under the
federal Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act
of 2009.37 The defendant Hill had "boastfully admitted to physically and
violently assaulting a co-worker preparing packages for interstate sale and
shipment because of the co-worker's sexual orientation." 38
At the time of the incident, Hill and his victim were engaged in tasks
such as moving, binning, packing, loading, and scanning items for shipment
from the Amazon Fulfillment Center in Chester, Virginia.3 9 From the record,
Hill approached the victim "from behind and-without provocation or
warning-repeatedly punched him in the face." 40 The victim was treated at
the Amazon in-house medical clinic and at a local hospital for bruising, cuts,
and a bloody nose. 4 1
The victim did not return to work for the remaining several hours of his
35. Questions of the necessary kind and degree of causal relationship between a bias motive and
the harm inflicted have been addressed in various legal contexts, with no single approach to the necessary
causation emerging as generally applicable. One court has surveyed interpretations of the phrase "because
of," including as "a motivating factor," "a substantial reason," "a significant factor," and more stringently,
"solely because of," or else a "but-for" cause of the harm. For discussion, see United States v. Jenkins,
120 F. Supp. 3d 650, 655 (E.D. Ky. 2013). Jenkins itself, a hate crimes case, appears to distinguish
between "a" substantial factor and "the" substantial factor, and to require that the prohibited bias be "the
factor that motivates the conduct...." Id. at 658. Of course, an act may have two or more jointly
necessary causes, or there may be no single necessary or indispensable cause, as the act could have two
or motivating causes, each of which would by itself suffice to cause the act, with no single one of these
causes itself being necessary. For background, see generally Tony Honore, Necessary and Sufficient
Conditions in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 363 (David G. Owen ed., 1997).
36. United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2019).
37. Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 4701-13, 123 Stat. 2190, 2833-44 (2009) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
249(a)(2) (2018)) [hereinafter Hate Crimes Prevention Act] (rider to Defense Authorization Act).
38. Hill, 927 F.3d at 193; see also id. at 194.
39. See id. at 193.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 194.
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shift. 42 The immediate workplace area was closed for perhaps 3 0-45 minutes
to remove the victim's blood from the floor.43 As it turned out, the Amazon
Center did not miss any relevant deadlines "because other areas of the facility
absorbed the work."4 4
Hill was initially charged with the state law offense of misdemeanor
assault and battery.4 5 The state prosecutor, however, noting the absence of
any Virginia hate crimes statutory protection based on sexual orientation, 46
asked that the federal government assume the prosecution of the case. 4 7 A
federal grand jury then indicted Hill under the Hate Crimes Prevention Act.48
The indictment charged Hill with attacking the defendant "because of' 49 the
victim's "actual and perceived sexual orientation."50
As to the necessary relation between Hill's act and the interstate
commerce power, the indictment charged that Hill "interfered with
commercial activity in which [the victim] was engaged at the time of the
conduct,"51 and "otherwise affected interstate and foreign commerce. "52
The court majority in the Hill case addressed both the facial and the as-
applied legitimacy of the Hate Crime Prevention statute pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. 53 The majority noted the specific attention of Congress
to the scope of its Commerce Clause power in constitutionally justifying the
Hate Crimes Prevention Act.54 Congress had distinguished hate crimes from
other, non-hate-based violent crimes.55 Among the findings of Congress was
that hate-motivated violent crimes "affect interstate commerce in many
ways." 56
In particular, the congressional findings located an interstate nexus
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id. One might ask, however, whether interstate commerce could be sufficiently affected by an
act that stretches Amazon's local distributing capacity thinner by forcing Amazon to call upon other
workers, or upon reserve workers, to take on additional tasks, whether at the immediate expense of their
other tasks or not.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. (referring to the federal hate crimes statute in supra note 37).
49. See id. For the lack of consensus on the precise import of "because of' in this and similar
contexts, see supra note 35.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 196.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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referring to the impeded and the forced movement across state lines of
victimized members of the specified targeted groups;5 7 to the prevention of
targeted group members from fully participating in the interstate economy;58
to the crossing of state lines by hate crime perpetrators; 59 to the use by
perpetrators of the "channels, facilities, and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce; 60 and to violence perpetrated by using objects that have
themselves traveled in interstate commerce. 6 1 Whether any one, or some
combination of, these factors, to one extent or another, could suffice to
establish a constitutionally satisfactory link between a given hate crime and
interstate commerce was left unaddressed by Congress.
What seems clear, however, is that Congress intended to extend the
coverage of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act to the full scope of its power to
regulate interstate commerce. That is, there was no congressional intent to
adopt a restricted scope for the Hate Crime Prevention Act by requiring a
stronger connection between the underlying conduct and interstate
commerce than would be constitutionally necessary. 62
The court in Hill then concluded that "when Congress may regulate an
economic or commercial activity, it also may regulate violent conduct that
interfaces with or affects that activity." 63 Based on this understanding of the
law and the facts recited above, the court saw no error in the jury's finding
that Hill's conduct "interfered with" 64 or "affected" 65 the "preparation of
packages for interstate sale and shipment, and therefore 'affect[ed]
commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction."' 66
That the Amazon facility's operations were in some respects
unaffected, or only minimally affected, did not dictate a contrary result, as
"Congress may regulate interference with commerce, even if the effect of the
interference on interstate commerce in an individual case is 'minimal. '67 In
as-applied challenges, the courts are to look not to the interstate commerce
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. For background discussion, see Russellv. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 860-62 (1985);
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 856-57 (2000) (declining to impute an exceptionally broad intended
scope of coverage to Congress in enacting the federal arson statute).
63. Hill, 927 F.3d at 201.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 202 (citing Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2016) (Hobbs Act robbery
and firearm case)).
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significance or insignificance of the particular event in question, but to the
impact on interstate commerce of an aggregated class of offending acts,
taken together.6 8
Certainly, the hate-motivated battery in Hill need not be thought of as,
itself, some sort of economic or commercial transaction. 6 9 Instead, the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act's explicit interstate commerce nexus requirements,
or its jurisdictional hook, "ensures that the statute regulates only economic
violent criminal conduct, not . .. noneconomic violent criminal conduct." 70
Thus the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, as properly interpreted, requires that
the victim have been engaged at the time of the offense in economic or
commercial activity. 1 It does not purport to grant a general federal license
to prosecute all hate-motivated crimes, however private the circumstances. 72
The Hill case, however, also produced a dissenting opinion on the
merits of the Commerce Clause nexus issue. 7 3 Judge Agee determined, in
dissent, that Hill's prosecution fell outside the boundaries of congressional
power to legislate crimes pursuant to its interstate commerce regulatory
power.7 4 Judge Agee found the Hate Crime Prevention Act's explicit
jurisdictional provision,75 or its jurisdictional nexus, to extend the reach of
the statute beyond the legitimate scope of the Commerce Clause. 7 6 Judge
Agee determined that the defendant's "bias-motivated punch ... [was] not
an inherently economic activity and therefore not within the scope of
Congress' Commerce Clause authority."7 7 His crucial focus was thus on the
defendant's motive and his conduct, in and of itself. A bias-motivated
battery, presumably, might be committed partly from bias, and partly from a
desire to prevent the victim from engaging in interstate commerce. In such a
case the perpetrator might himself therein be affecting interstate commerce.
But not all bias-motivated batteries need have, in themselves, any such
relation to interstate commerce.
Judge Agee's underlying concern was with the potential illimitability
68. See id.
69. For the reliance on this distinction, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000)
(Violence Against Women Act case).
70. Hill, 927 F.3d at 204, 205. For discussion of the typical value, but not the invariable
decisiveness, of an explicit statutory jurisdictional "hook" or linkage to interstate commerce, see id. at
208.
71. See id. at 205.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 210 (Agee, J., dissenting).
74. See id. (Agee, J., dissenting).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) (2018).
76. See Hill, 927 F.3d at 210 (Agee, J., dissenting).
77. See id. (Agee, J., dissenting).
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of the federal Commerce Clause. In his words:
To allow Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause power over the non-
economic offense of a bias-motivated punch would allow Congress to
exercise its Commerce Clause power based on such indirect-and often,
as here, non-existent-connection to commerce that it converts the Clause
into a federal police power.7 8
Judge Agee argued that permitting the Hate Crime Prevention Act's
jurisdictional statute to cover the case at bar would encompass any bias-
motivated battery "as long as the government can show that the victim [as
distinct from the defendant] was 'engaged' in some sort of economic
activity." 79 Given what he saw in this case as an "attenuated"80 linkage
between the regulated conduct and interstate commerce,81 Judge Agee feared
for the constitutional distinction "between what is truly national and what is
truly local."82
Overall, the Hill case at least suggests most of the significant issues
associated with the limits of the congressional interstate commerce power.
The crucial underlying problem, however, is that not all of the issues present
in the Hill case are consciously and expressly recognized, let alone
consciously addressed. This Article takes up the important issues, both
recognized and latent, in Hill below. 83 Any understanding of these issues,
however, depends upon a sense of the relevant Supreme Court case law.
Thus, a highly selective, stage-setting presentation of the most crucially
relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence follows.
II. THE SUPREME COURT CASES: SOURCE OF ANSWERS AND OF
UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
However much the Supreme Court may have later vacillated between
expansive and narrowing approaches to the scope of the interstate commerce
power, the seminal case of Gibbons v. Ogden84 seems to endorse a broad
understanding of, respectively, the scope and meaning of "commerce,"85 the
78. Id. at 223 (Agee, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Agee, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
80. Id. at 224 (Agee, J., dissenting).
81. See id. (Agee, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 225 (Agee, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18
(2000)).
83. See infra Part III.
84. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
85. See id. at 189-90 (defining "commerce" as extending far beyond the actual traffic in or
exchange of commodities).
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scope and meaning of "interstate" commerce, 86 and the scope and meaning
of "regulation" of interstate commerce. 8 The mark left by the Gibbons
opinion in each of these respects has been, despite changing judicial
emphases, indelible.
The Gibbons opinion attempted to describe the distinctive nature of the
commerce that is, for constitutional purposes, interstate in character. In the
words of Chief Justice Marshall, distinctively "interstate" commerce does
not encompass the commerce that "is completely internal [to a single state],
which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different
parts of the same State ... "88 This language, however, tells us only what
interstate commerce is not.
When Chief Justice Marshall expressed the idea of "interstate" more
positively, he set a durable precedent by referring to the ideas of commerce
extending to, concerning, or, crucially, "affecting,"89 more than one state.90
The language of "affecting" more than one state has become an apparently
essential element of the Commerce Clause cases. The language of
"affecting" interstate commerce in some sufficient fashion, or to some
sufficient degree, recurs throughout crucial cases including Wickard v.
Filburn,91 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,92 Katzenbach v.
McClung,93 United States v. Lopez,94 United States v. Morrison,9 5 Gonzales
v. Raich,96 and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 97
86. See id. at 193-95.
87. See id. at 195-200 (defining "regulation" as extending far beyond prohibition, as distinct from
a broader power of imposing any sort of rule regarding the object in question).
88. Id. at 194.
89. See id. at 194-95 (using the language of "extend to or affect other states;" of "concerns which
affect the States generally;" and of "affect other states").
90. See id.
91. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (home consumption of home-produced
wheat).
92. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (holding that a racially
segregated Georgia hotel sufficiently affected interstate commerce).
93. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964) (using "affect other states" language
as well as that of "exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce").
94. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (discussing gun possession in school
zone case and referring to "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce"). For an exceptionally
useful and concise overview of the Lopez case on what constitutes commerce and interstate commerce,
see Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 746-47 (1995).
95. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000) (federal Violence Against Women
Act case) (discussing the "effects" and the "substantial effects" language in Lopez).
96. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19-20 (2005) (discussing the scope of the federal power to
regulate local marijuana cultivation and addressing the aggregated effects of local cultivation on interstate
drug prices and the overall "substantial effect" on the national market).
97. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012) (plurality opinion)
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The Court's continuing reliance on the concept of "affecting," or
"concerning," interstate commerce leads, however, into important general
and specific9 8 problems of vagueness and of policy uncertainty.
The Court's inquiries into the idea of "affecting" interstate commerce
become inseparable from questions of adding up, or aggregating, many
instances of activities that each, by themselves, have only a trivial effect on
interstate commerce. The Court's willingness to aggregate individually
minimal effects on interstate commerce is famously developed in Wickard v.
Fillburn.99
In Wickard, an individual farmer exceeded his allotted wheat
production quota, with the excess wheat then being variously used on his
own local farm, rather than being sold on the interstate wheat market. 100 The
farmer was by himself a price-taker, rather than a price-maker, in the wheat
market. But the Court noted the existence of many other farmers similarly
situated under the farm price support program in question. 10 1 Based on the
logic of aggregation, the Court declared:
That [Filbum's] own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial
by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation
where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, is far from trivial. 102
The idea of aggregating a number of individually insignificant cases
into a collectively sufficient effect on interstate commerce was then later
pursued against individual businesses in the racial discrimination cases, 1 03 in
Gonzales,10 4 in Sebelius,105 and in the Hobbs Act robbery case of Taylor v.
(discussing the Affordable Care Act individual mandate and referring to aggregation of similar activities
that jointly "substantially affect .. . interstate commerce"). The Sebelius case also illustrates the frequent
attempts by the courts to resolve Commerce Clause power cases through some sort of distinction between
a party's "activity" as opposed to that party's "passivity" in the relevant respect. See id. at 553-55.
98. The question of how much of an effect on interstate commerce is actually required is
notoriously unresolved as among merely potential effects, slight actual or probable effects, and significant
or substantial effects, whether actual or likely. See United States v. Lee, 834 F.3d 145, 150-51 (2d Cir.
2016).
99. See Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
100. See id. at 114-15.
101. See id. at 127.
102. Id. at 127-29.
103. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964).
104. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19, 22 (2005).
105. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012) (plurality opinion)
("Congress's power ... is not limited to regulation of an activity that by itself substantially affects
interstate commerce, but also extends to activities that do so only when aggregated with similar activities
of others.").
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United StateS.106 Unfortunately, the idea of aggregation in the Commerce
Clause area is fraught with a number of unaddressed, and certainly
unresolved, problems. 10 7
The Court has also attempted to draw Commerce Clause boundary lines
through recourse to some sort of distinction between "activity," or initiative-
taking by the relevant party, and "passivity," or something like ordinary
behavior apart from any distinctive association with interstate commerce.
While this distinction is most familiar from Sebelius, which dealt with the
Affordable Care Act,10 the active-passive distinction, or something akin
thereto, also occurs elsewhere. 109 This inevitably controversial and contested
distinction is also briefly explored below. 110
Finally, the Court has acknowledged that in many of the most
interesting cases, the Commerce Clause power is really not primarily about
commerce. The power to regulate interstate commerce is, in such cases,
instead seized upon opportunistically by Congress as an expedient means of
promoting some element of morality, equality, justice, or personal dignity.
Regulating the flow of goods, services, or persons in interstate commerce
may be a genuine, but secondary, concern to the legislators in such cases.
Among the Supreme Court cases in which the Commerce Clause power was
successfully invoked largely to promote morality, equality, justice, or
personal dignity are the foreign and interstate lottery ticket suppression case
of Champion v. Ames,"' the sex trafficking case of Caminetti v. United
States,112 the multiple spouse case of Cleveland v. United States,113 and of
course the civil rights cases in the line of Heart ofAtlanta Motel. 114
106. See Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2016) (referring not to any individual
criminal activity, but to "Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic
'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce" and to a '"class of activities'
that in the aggregate substantially affect interstate commerce").
107. See infra Part III.
108. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 553-55.
109. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000); Russell v. United States, 471 U.S.
858, 861 (1985).
110. See infra Part III.
111. Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 327-28 (1903) (discussing the interstate
transportation of foreign lottery tickets as, supposedly, "confessedly injurious to the public morals").
112. Caminettiv. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917) (referring to "the authority of Congress
to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses").
113. Clevelandv. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946) (holding that the interstate commerce power
"may be used to defeat what are deemed to be immoral practices," despite the resemblance in the actual
underlying federal legislative motive to the exercise of state police powers).
114. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250, 256-57 (1964) (referring
respectively to the "fundamental object" of vindicating "personal dignity;" to "immoral and injurious
use" of the channels of interstate commerce; and to "legislating against moral wrongs" as, on a mere
rational basis review, clearly permissible aims under the Commerce Clause).
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These broad, morality-focused cases may be at some distance from the
core Commerce Clause cases, which are more economic-efficiency
focused. 1 15 We explore below, however, the possibility that a moral focus
may substantially contribute to our best understanding of how to decide the
close Commerce Clause cases more generally. 1 16 For the present, though, the
Supreme Court cases cited above suggest some of the largely insoluble
boundary area problems inherent in the Commerce Clause cases. These
dimensions include problems of general and specific vagueness and ill-
definedness; controversy and contestability in applying the concepts of
"affecting" and "concerning;"118 reliance on the perennially controversial
distinction between "active" and merely "passive" connections to interstate
commerce; 1 19 and a number of largely unacknowledged problems associated
with the idea of aggregation. 12 0 These elements of the boundary problems of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence are addressed below.
III. DIAGNOSING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE BOUNDARY AREA
PROBLEMS
The underlying dynamic in Commerce Clause controversies often
reflects differences as to the relevance and the weight of ideas such as
federalism, efficiency, democracy, decentralization, plurality and dispersion
of authority, and local experimentalism. 12 1 These differences, however, have
manifested themselves in the Commerce Clause cases in distinctive recurring
problems.
First are the problems we may classify under the heading of vagueness.
Vagueness, for our purposes, is a matter of some number of borderline, 12 2 or
better, boundary area cases of the proper application of a term.123 While We
115. This is despite the inevitable broader federalism issues. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (discussing the permissibility of federal regulation of intrastate rail
freight rates where necessary to the proper regulation of interstate rates).
116. See infra Part IV.
117. See infra notes 122-132 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 133-145 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 146-153 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 154-167 and accompanying text.
121. For background references, see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 177-81
(8th ed. 2018); see generally Guido Calabresi & Eric S. Fish, Federalism and MoralDisagreement, 101
MINN. L. REv. 1 (2016).
122. See Ray Sorenson, Vagueness, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 5, 2018), https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/vagueness [https://perma.cc/UMA3-ZMLA].
123. See id. The philosophers' debate whether any boundary case has a genuinely right
classification-for example, either bald, or else not bald-even if that right answer is unknowable to us.
For this debate, see generally Timothy Williamson, Precis of Vagueness, 57 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 921 (1997) (referring to TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS (1994));
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might say that in a sense, all ordinary language is vague, 12 4 vagueness clearly
is also a matter of degree. 12 5 In our context, "commerce" and "interstate
commerce" are both relatively vague, but the Constitution plainly aspires to
a logic of bivalence, 1 26 or binary classification. Commerce and non-
commerce are thought to jointly exhaust the field. They are not thought to be
mere segments on a broad continuous spectrum with numerous degrees.
Judicially attempting to fit relatively vague ideas such as "commerce"
or "interstate commerce" into bivalent categories-either within or beyond
the authorized constitutional scope-will often seem arbitrary and futile. But
as we consider below, it may still be possible to adjudicate close Commerce
Clause cases by reference to the presence or absence of any overriding
interests 12 7 or fundamental rights 12 8 that may be lurking in the case at hand,
even if the effect of the decision in that case is largely symbolic or expressive
in character. 129
The courts may attempt to reduce the vagueness of "commerce" and of
"interstate commerce" by applying some form of original intent or original
meaning theory. 13 0 And such approaches are sometimes endorsed by
Commerce Clause scholars today. 1 3 1 But even if we endorse some inevitably
Timothy Williamson & Peter Simons, Vagueness and Ignorance, 66 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 145
(1992); Timothy Williamson, Wrighton the Epistemic Conception of Vagueness, 56 ANALYSIS 39 (1996).
More broadly, see TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 57-75 2000).
124. See Bertrand Russell, Vagueness, 1 AUSTRALASIAN J. PSYCH. & PHIL. 84, 84 (1923).
125. See id. at 88.
126. For background, see Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical
Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 516 (1994).
127. See generally Delia Graff Fara, Shifting Sands: An Interest Relative Theory of Vagueness, 28
PHIL. TOPICS 45 (2000).
128. See Keith C. Culver, Varieties of Vagueness, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 109, 111 (2004). For a sense
of Dworkin's moral right-oriented approach to legal vagueness, see generally Ronald Dworkin, No Right
Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY & SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.LA. HART 58 (Clarendon Press ed.
1977).
129. For elaboration, see infra Part IV.
130. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) for the historical intent theory adopted by Chief
Justice Marshall throughout the case.
131. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010) (discussing the then
contemporary meaning of "commerce" as not confined narrowly to economic matters, but as also
including social interactions beyond business or trade that pose collective action problems); Randy E.
Barnett, Jack Balkin's Interaction Theory of "Commerce," 2012 ILL. L. REV. 623 (discussing the then
contemporary usage of "commerce" as, in practice, not including even economic production, let alone
social interaction more broadly); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001) (arguing "commerce" originally meant something akin to the exchange of
goods and services); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387 (1987); Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A Response to
Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55, 56 (2010) (discussing the contemporary
understandings of "commerce" in both ordinary and legal contexts as encompassing "mercantile trade
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controversial specific version of originalism, the remaining indeterminacies
and apparently unresolvable disputes must limit our progress in usefully
pinning down the vagueness of the terms in question. 13 2
Even if we could resolve the vagueness issues associated with
commerce" and "interstate commerce" themselves, we would then have to
confront the Court's familiar jurisprudence of conduct that, in some
sufficient way, "affects" or "concerns" interstate commerce. 13 3 Here, we set
aside any issues of vagueness, and focus instead on substantive, policy-based
uncertainties as to how to best understand and apply terms such as "affects"
or "concerns."
Whether an activity "affects," and perhaps "sufficiently affects,"
commerce or interstate commerce is not a matter of dictionary entries, but of
substantive policy choices. A number of the issues are, by analogy, present
as well in the use of "affects," "concerns," and similar concepts in the classic
work of John Stuart Mill on the boundaries of the legitimate exercise of
individual liberty. 13 4 As it turns out, even the celebrated philosopher John
Stuart Mill could not apply the concepts of "affect" or "concern" with any
consistency. It would be surprising if a shifting, multi-member body such as
the Supreme Court could regularly fare any better.
Thus Mill seeks at points to draw the boundary line for permissible
government regulation of a person's activity at what "concerns" the self, as
presumably distinct from activity that concerns others. 13 5 Perhaps more
realistically, Mill sometimes shifts to a focus on activity that "more
particularly concerns" others. 1 36 In a related additional qualification, Mill
also sometimes seeks to crucially distinguish between effects of conduct on
and traditionally associated activities" as the primary meaning). For a reading of a nearly
contemporaneous essay by David Hume that offers no unequivocal evidence either way, see generally
David Hume, Of Commerce, in SELECTED ESSAYS 154 (Stephen Copley & Andrew Edgar eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 2008).
132. See supra note 13 1. Fittingly, Dr. Samuel Johnson'sA Dictionary ofthe English Language, as
of 1755, offers both a relatively broad and a relatively narrow understanding of the meaning of
"commerce." See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 417-18 (1755),
available at https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/commerce-noun [https://perma.cc/UF9Y-5TPG]. To
the extent that the disputes focus on differences between economic and noneconomic affairs, see David
M. Driesen, The Economic/Noneconomic Activity Distinction Under the Commerce Clause, 67 CASEW.
RES. L. REV. 337, 338 (2016) ("Scholars agree that Lopez and Morrison offer no guidance about how to
apply the economic/noneconomic distinction, leaving lower courts adrift.").
133. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
134. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY & UTILITARIANISM (Wordsworth 2016)
(1859).
135. See id. at 15, 16, 83; see also id. at 87 (referring to "self-regarding conduct" and to "purely
personal conduct").
136. Id. at 78.
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others that are "direct" and effects of conduct on others that are merely
"indirect." 13 7
But then, perhaps recognizing the dubiousness of this direct-indirect
effect distinction, Mill shifts from a focus on affecting others to a focus more
specifically on affecting their interests, 13 8 or affecting their interests
"prejudicially." 13 9 Mill also seeks to avoid the direct-indirect effect
distinction, as well as the problem of identifying interests, by sometimes
drawing the crucial line at conduct that "seriously affects" 14 0 others. Mill
does not, however, consistently draw the crucial line at serious harms, as
opposed to harms that may be less serious. 14 1 In fact, Mill sometimes
qualifies his "harm" principle to allow for the regulation of activities that
merely pose a "a definite risk of damage" to others. 1 42 The inescapable
bottom line is thus simply one of confusion.
Unavoidably, the Court in the Commerce Clause cases must by analogy
either confront each of the problems above that afflict Mill's parallel
discussion, or fail in its responsibilities. As it turns out, the Court often relies,
for example, on the plainly doubtful and not obviously significant direct-
versus-indirect effect on interstate commerce distinction. 14 3 And where the
Court is concerned about effects on interstate commerce, it has often seemed
to require that the effects be somehow "substantial." 144 But the Court has
also then admitted that "our case law has not been clear whether an activity
must 'affect' or 'substantially affect' interstate commerce in order to be
within Congress' power to regulate .... "145
Overall, the Court has not managed the idea of "affecting" commerce
137. See id. at 79, 81, 83.
138. At least without their valid consent. See id. at 14, 78, 81, 97.
139. Id. at 78, 79, 97. For a classic discussion of the distinction between affecting others and
affecting their interests, see J.C. Rees, A Re-Reading ofAil On Liberty, in LIMITS OF LIBERTY: STUDIES
OF MILL'S ON LIBERTY 87, 93 (Peter Radcliff ed., 1966).
140. MILL, supra note 134, at 84; see also id. at 15 (referring to causing "evil" to others).
141. See id. at 16 (focusing on "harm" to others).
142. Id. at 85, 97. For a sense of the critical accounts of these distinctions and theirvalue, see DAVID
0. BRINK, MILL'S PROGRESSIVE PRINCIPLES 173-90 (2013); JOHN GRAY, MILL ONLIBERTY: ADEFENCE
48-57 (2d ed. 1996) (critiquing the approach of Rees, supra note 139); DALE E. MILLER, J.S. MILL 117-
32 (2010); JONATHAN RILEY, MILL ON LIBERTY 98-102 (1998); C.L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY 52-67
(1980); David 0. Lyons, Liberty and Harm to Others, in MILL'S ON LIBERTY: CRITICAL ESSAYS 115
(Gerald Dworkin ed., 1997); Ben Saunders, Reformulating Mill's Harm Principle, 125 MIND 1005-06
(2016) (emphasizing consent or the lack of consent, as opposed to harm).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557-58 (1995) (citing NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609, 612, 615; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59
(citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
145. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559; see also United States v. Lee, 834 F.3d 145, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2016).
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or interstate commerce any more consistently than did John Stuart Mill in
the context of the limits to liberty. A final possibility, though, often anises in
the cases in which a statute invokes the Commerce Clause power, but not to
its full extent, leaving some constitutionally regulable activities outside the
scope of the statute. 14 6 In such cases, typically some object must have been
"used" in interstate commerce. And this statutory requirement has typically
moved the courts to distinguish between the "active" use and the mere
"passive" use of the entity in interstate commerce. 14 7
The attempts by courts to clarify such cases by means of an active-
passive use distinction often fail immediately, based on arbitrary
descriptions of the specific case circumstances. Consider, for example, an
act of arson that reaches only one small building among a complex of other
buildings, where only the latter buildings are thought to be "actively" used
in interstate commerce. Perhaps these latter buildings could not possibly
have been affected by the fire in question. Will it usually be obvious whether
the arsonist's hostility is directed toward one particular building among
related other buildings? Isn't the arsonist's real hostility sometimes directed
toward the entire building complex, or toward the institution or idea it
represents? 148
Beyond such largely arbitrary line-drawing among the possible targeted
properties, these cases typically take an elaborate inventory of the ways an
entity might be said to be used in interstate commerce, including sometimes
marginal matters such as telephone communications or media use; highway
use; various forms of insurance; building leases and their terms; the full
range of all the activities on one or more of the properties; property use or
mere availability to out-of-state guests; property ownership structure; and
even connections to utility services. 14 9 Some of these considerations are then
146. See, e.g., supra note 22; Jonesv. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 856-57 (2000); Russellv. United
States, 471 U.S. 858, 860-62 (1985); see also Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 866 (2014) (on the
courts' reluctance to broadly interpret a federal criminal statute to impinge upon matters traditionally
allocated to state regulation, given the value of federalism, unless Congress has made a "clear statement"
to the contrary).
147. See, e.g., supra note 146.
148. Consider the disputes over the proper characterizations of targeted buildings and of
organizational relationships. For background, see United States v. Laton, 352 F.3d 286, 298-30 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing United States v. Rayborn, 312 F.3d 229, 234 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Terry, 257
F.3d 366, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir. 2001)); United
States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249, 1255-57 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rea, 300 F.3d 952, 960-61
(8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Tush, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250-1254 (D. Kan. 2001).
149. See supra note 148; see also United States v. Corum, 362 F.3d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 2004) ("It is
well-established that telephones, even when used intrastate, are instrumentalities of interstate
commerce."). Realistically, the degree of any judicial tendency to stretch the idea of interstate commercial
linkage may reflect, in some cases, the sheer gravity of any charged criminal activity.
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said to fall within the scope of "active" use of the relevant property in
interstate commerce, and others to amount only to "passive," and thus
statutorily insufficient, use.Iso
Unavoidably, characterizing a particular feature of an arson-targeted
entity as "active" or as "passive" with respect to its use in interstate
commerce will typically be largely arbitrary. So will a determination that
some set of such activities adds up to a somehow sufficient connection to
interstate commerce. But the real problem is that the active-passive use
distinction unavoidably sends us down a deeply controversial path. There is
a substantial and unresolved debate among the philosophers on the
usefulness of the broader active-passive distinction in various contexts.15 1
Of course, the Court is not bound to recognize a relevant philosophical
controversy, as it is similarly not bound in the Commerce Clause cases by
the relevant conclusions of the economists. Thus, the Court in Sebelius
argued that "[t]o an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between
activity and inactivity; both have measurable economic effects on
commerce. But the distinction ... would not have been lost on the
Framers" 15 2 The problem in our more general context, though, is that the
Framers had no clear intent as to how to draw, in practice, any distinction
between actively using versus merely passively using some object or
property in interstate commerce. If the courts continue to attempt to rely on
this distinction, any private party with any inclination to do so can
strategically adjust their behavior in such a way as to either minimally
qualify or else not qualify as actively using a property in interstate
commerce. 153
A final, and typically unrecognized, crucial boundary area problem
150. See supra notes 147-148.
151. See, e.g., JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 95-97 (1990) (discussing
different sorts of omissions and passivities); Peter Davson-Galle, Killing and Relevantly Similar Letting
Die, 15 APPLIED PHIL. 199 (1998); Helga Kuhse, Critical Notice: Why Killing Is Not Always Worse-
And Is Sometimes Better-Than Letting Die, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 371(1998); Xiaofei
Liu, A Robust Defense ofthe Doctrine ofDoing and Allowing, 24 UTILITAS 63 (2012); E.J. Lowe, Active
and Passive Euthanasia: An Objection, 55 PHIL. 550 (1980); Joseph Raz, The Active and the Passive, 71
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 211 (1997); Fiona Woollard & Frances Howard-
Snyder, Doing vs. Allowing Harm, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Nov. 1, 2016), https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/doing-allowing [https://perma.cc/HKP5-M9ST]. Very roughly, the more one cares about
actual consequences, as distinct from the state of mind of a party, the less value in general will one tend
to see in the act versus passivity or omission distinction. Of course, we can also imagine omissions or
passivities that are clearly intended to result in great harm.
152. Nat'lFed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 555 (2012).
153. However rarely any entity might be thus motivated, given the availability of insurance and of
state-level arson statutes.
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involves the Court's jurisprudence of aggregation, in which small units are
added up to create an overall "substantial" effect on interstate commerce. 1 54
The Commerce Clause aggregation jurisprudence is central not only to
Wickard,155 but to Morrison,156 Raich,157 Taylor,158 and thence to the recent
hate crime case discussed above, United States v. Hill.1 59
To this point, however, the Court has not meaningfully addressed
several of the most basic problems attending the aggregation process in the
Commerce Clause cases. First, the Court has never determined in a definite
way whether the aggregation of intrastate activities can consist partly or even
entirely of non-economic or non-commercial activities. 16 0 Second, the Court
has referred merely to a "class" of activities that is to be aggregated for
purposes of determining whether a substantial effect on interstate commerce
exists. 16 1 But the Court has not meaningfully addressed how to define or limit
even a clearly economic "class" of activities. Classes of relevantly similar
activities are not self-identifying. Classes can be defined at various degrees
of specificity or generality, 16 2 by either Congress or by the courts.
As merely one example of this class definition problem, consider the
problem of criminal attempts. Can criminal attempts, as well as completed
offenses, be somehow aggregated in such a way as to "substantially" affect
interstate commerce, on a reasonable congressional judgment? 16 3 More
broadly, can the somehow relevantly similar other class members be merely
hypothetical? Or else perhaps likely to exist, over some appropriate period
of time? Or perhaps just reasonably possible? And, crucially, how would
these numbers of class members change over time if the relevant statute
154. The leading aggregation case is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See generally Jim
Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719 (2003) (discussing Filburn and its legacy).
155. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
156. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
157. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-22 (2005).
158. See Taylorv. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2016).
159. See United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting Hill's battery as not in
itself affecting the Amazon Center's ability to meet any of its measured deadlines or quotas).
160. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. The degree of deference due from courts to congressional
findings, or the effects of the absence of such congressional findings, in the context of aggregation issues
also varies noticeably. See id. at 614.
161. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 22; Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2080; see also Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) ("Where the class ... is within the reach of the federal power, the courts have
no power to 'excise, as trivial, individual instances of that class."' (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183, 193 (1968)).
162. See John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly,
97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 179-80 (1998). Of course, the very idea of a "substantial" effect, whether through
aggregation or not, partakes of vagueness in unusual measure. See generally R. George Wright,
Substantial Burdens in the Law, 46 Sw. L. REV. 1 (2016) (exploring this vagueness at length).
163. See Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081-82 (attempt to rob prosecuted under the Hobbs Act).
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either were or were not enforced pursuant to the Commerce Clause? 16 4 Class
membership, however defined, need not be fixed overtime and unresponsive
to enforcement policies. Any enforcement or lack of enforcement of a statute
may create incentives, or disincentives, for persons to join the class in
question.
More broadly, the Court's aggregation in arriving at a "substantial"
effect on interstate commerce faces what is classically called the Sorites
problem. 16 5 The Sorites problem notices that in many binary classification
problems, very small changes in the numbers do not allow us to make any
principled change in how we classify the case in question. 1 66 Thus if aperson
with, say, 117 hairs is bald, so, we seem bound to say, is someone with 118.
The problem is that there is no distinct further incremental point-say, then
moving from 118 to 119 hairs-at which the person becomes non-bald. But
some persons, inescapably, are not bald. In the Commerce Clause area, too,
there will be no principled reason to find that some single additional incident
or some additional single actor has somehow transformed a previously
insubstantial effect into a substantial effect on interstate commerce. If 117
farmers produce only an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce, so,
presumably, would 118. But equally clearly, some number of farmers
suffices for a substantial collective effect on interstate commerce.
A related further problem addresses the status of universalizing
principles, or more familiarly, the status of "what if everyone did that?" tests
for any proposed principles. What if Congress or the courts were to find a
substantial effect on interstate commerce based on the outcome if "everyone"
somehow similarly situated to the defendant-perhaps everyone in
general-acted as the defendant did? This would be done not in order to
show that the defendant acted in a morally wrong manner, 16 7 but for
164. There were obviously, in 1942, many U.S. wheat farmers. Some percentage of them
participated in the relevant price support and quota program. And some unspecified percentage of those
farmers may have acted in a way either loosely or else closely similar to Roscoe Filburn in Filburn. And
every Commerce Clause ruling is of course an incentive to change or maintain one's present conduct.
165. For background, see Dominic Hyde & Diana Raffman, Sorites Paradox, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox
[https://perma.cc/YFQ4-DR2G].
166. See id.
167. For universalizability, or a "what if everyone did that?" question, as a possible test for the
morality of particular acts, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 71
(H.J. Paton trans. 1948) (Harper ed. 1964) (1785); see also BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL CODE, REAL WORLD
188-89 (2000)) (focusing on the expected value of rules if they were internalized by the "overwhelming
majority"); Kent Bach, When to Ask, "What IfEveryone Did That?, " 37 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RES. 464 (1977); Michael Robbins, The Fallacy of "What IfEverybody Did That?, " 6 Sw. J. PHIL. 89
(1975). For a broader discussion of aggregation problems in general, see IWAO HIROSE, MORAL
AGGREGATION (2015); LARRY S. TEMKIN, RETHINKING THE GOOD: MORAL IDEALS AND THE NATURE
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constitutional interpretive and policymaking purposes. Would finding a
given actor to violate a federal statute based on the substantial effect on
interstate commerce that would result if "everyone" at some point acted
similarly be reasonable?
Overall, then, the courts attempting to address the close cases as to the
scope and meaning of the federal Commerce Clause power face daunting
problems as to vagueness; 16 8 the debates over "affecting" commerce; 1 69
active versus passive involvement in interstate commerce; 170 and the proper
meaning and limits of aggregating in order to reach a somehow substantial
effect on interstate commerce.171 Jointly, these largely unresolved problems
threaten to impeach the claim that any particular resolution of a close
Commerce Clause case is more reasonable than deciding the case in some
contrary fashion. Below, we briefly suggest a value-sensitive alternative
approach to the close Commerce Clause power cases.
IV. THE ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL
SYMBOLISM
Let us think of a "close" Commerce Clause case not so much as one
which is merely controversial, or which would divide judges, but as one in
which the arguments for opposed judicial outcomes seem to an observer to
be largely non-comparable, or else nearly equal in their opposed overall
strength, even if the contending sides emphasize different considerations.
Given this non-comparability or else very rough equality in the perceived
strength of the opposed arguments, it seems likely that in some cases,
deciding the case in favor of, or against, the exercise of Commerce Clause
authority will not make much overall total value difference. 17 2 But
particularly if the two judicial outcomes stem from very different
assumptions, predictions, and values, it is also quite possible that deciding
even a close case "wrongly" may be costly.
The problem, as we have seen throughout, is that the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence generates, and then leaves unresolved and
often unrecognized, a number of basic interpretive problems. Until such
interpretive problems are somehow resolved, how can courts most
OF PRACTICAL REASONING 23-161 (2015).
168. See supra notes 122-132 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 133-145 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 146-153 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 154-167 and accompanying text.
172. If we cannot readily decide whether to go out for the evening or else to stay home, it may be
that taking either option would likely produce roughly equally overall value results.
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responsibly address and resolve the close cases?
One useful general strategy would be to consider whether the close
Commerce Clause case at issue is one that distinctively evokes what has been
called the symbolic1 7 3  or expressive1 7 4  functions of lawmaking and
adjudication. In a broad sense, symbolic or expressive law and adjudication
recurs throughout the law, including freedom of speech;17 5 equal protection
and respect; 1 76 Establishment Clause cases;177 tax policy;178 and of course in
expressivist theories of criminal punishment. 179
Symbolism and expressivism can play a useful role as well in
adjudicating the close Commerce Clause cases. Some such cases will
distinctively call for the embrace of symbolic or expressive considerations,
and other such cases much less so, or not at all. Where it is appropriate, courts
should attend to and invoke any distinctively relevant symbolic
considerations in deciding the close Commerce Clause cases.
Given the limited predictability of the real consequences of much
173. The classic citation in the political science literature is MuRRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC
USES OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1985). For a discussion of one element of our focus herein, see Sara Sun Beale,
Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool For Criminal Enforcement?, 80
B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1247-48 (2000).
174. For discussion, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories ofLaw:
A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000) ("At the most general level, expressive
theories tell actors . . . to act in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward various substantive
values.") (discussing "the pervasively expressive character of much of the law"); Richard H. McAdams,
An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339 (2000) ("A strict focus on
sanctions ... obscures how law can otherwise influence behavior. Legal Theorists sometimes posit that
law affects behavior 'expressively' by what it says rather than by what it does."); Cass R. Sunstein, On
The Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996) ("Many people support law
because of the statements made by law, and disagreements about law are frequently debates over the
expressive content of law."). If the idea of an expressive function of the law is understood too broadly,
however, the idea loses its distinctive interest value. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories ofLaw:
A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2000); Steven D. Smith, Expressivist
Jurisprudence and the Depletion ofMeaning, 60 MD. L. REV. 506, 511 (2001) ("[T]he claim that law
expresses meaning is . . . so universally recognized that in itself it can hardly amount to any distinctive
jurisprudential perspective.. . .").
175. See, e.g., the emotionally charged flag burning protest case of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
410-11 (1989).
176. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 174, at 1504.
177. See, e.g., Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An Expressive Jurisprudence of the
Establishment Clause, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 77 (2007).
178. See, e.g., Kitty Richards, An Expressive Theory of Tax, 27 CORNELL JL. & PUB. POL'Y 301
(2017).
179. For the classic source, see generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function ofPunishment,
49 MONIST 397 (1965). For discussion, see generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg On Crime and
Punishment: Exploring the Relationship Between the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and the
Expressive Function ofPunishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145 (2001); Susan A. Bandes, All Bathwater,
No Baby: Expressive Theories ofPunishment and the Death Penalty, 116 MICH. L. REV. 905 (2018).
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Commerce Clause-based legislation, it is important to recognize that
incorporating respect for symbolic value in adjudication need not always
aspire to provable change in any underlying behavior. Nor need symbolically
oriented adjudications amount merely to a trivial consolation prize for a
superficially "winning" party. Sometimes there is real public value in
"making a statement," in getting an institution officially "on the record" in
some context, or in fulfilling a public need to "send a message."180 Judicially
sending a symbolic or expressive message thus need not be aimed, at least
primarily, at producing any provable material change in the world.181
Some, but not all, of the close Commerce Clause cases will have some
loose association with fundamental constitutional rights and values, or even
with widely recognized basic human rights. 18 2 In those close Commerce
Clause cases, the mere presence of fundamental constitutional or human
rights concerns, even in the absence of their actual violation, should
ordinarily tip balance in favor of at least symbolically or expressively
acknowledging and endorsing the basic right in question.
Consider again in this context our exemplary hate crime case of United
States v. Hill.183 Hill involved a physical assault and battery, motivated by
hostility on the basis of sexual orientation. 18 4 In this instance, the nature of
the charge and the available range of penalties under Virginia state law could
not begin to match those available under the Federal Hate Crimes Prevention
Act.18 5  Particularly under these circumstances, especially including
victimization on the basis of sexual orientation, 18 6 along with the sheer
public physical battery itself,187 a national-level symbolic and expressive
180. Beale, supra note 173, at 1254.
181. Something akin to this point, and the underlying distinction among kinds of symbolic
adjudications, is discussed inMcAdams, supra note 174, at 339 n.2 (citing Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best
Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1624-25 (1998)). We assume, of course, that the Commerce Clause
case in question does not actually involve any actionable violation of any fundamental constitutional
right. Any such case should be adjudicated on precisely those fundamental constitutional right grounds.
182. For background, see generally JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2008); JAMES W. NICKEL,
MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1987); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS (2d ed. 1996).
183. United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2019); see also infra Part I.
184. See Hill, 927 F.3d at 193. Consider also the notorious racially-based hate crime case of United
States v. Roof 225 F. Supp. 3d 438 (D.S.C. 2016) (applying the federal Church Arson Act).
185. See Hill, 927 F.3d at 194. But again, there could still be justification for a Commerce Clause-
based federal prosecution, for national-level symbolic and expressive purposes, even if the federal and
state level and penalties were similar.
186. For an authoritative account of the effects of governmental sexual orientation discrimination
under an equal protection and substantive due process analysis, see generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
187. For the classic exposition of the relationship of basic physical safety, bodily integrity in public
spaces, and bodily security to even minimal well-being, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 183-86 (C.B.
MacPherson ed., 1968) (1651). For human rights references to physical security of the person, see
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statement is generally appropriate. Combined with the crucial element of
explicit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the public physical
battery in Hill and the fundamental status of physical safety suggest the value
of an authoritative judicial denunciation, and a clear symbolic statement
through a prosecution at the national level.
But not every close Commerce Clause case will evoke any sense of
lurking fundamental constitutional or human rights, or the basic values
underlying such rights, whether any such rights are actually violated in the
given case or not. Some close Commerce Clause cases are instead merely
near the limits of the congressional power to, for example, remove barriers
to the free and uninhibited flow of manufactured goods. Even the leading
case of Wickard v. Filburn involved only Filburn's alleged violation of his
own agreement to limit his wheat production in exchange for price
subsidies, 18 8 with no fundamental constitutional or human rights, or their
underlying basic values, anywhere on the horizon. No such rights are
typically relevant even to broad, important, health-related statutes and
regulations, as in, for example, the area of a legally specified uniformity in
food nutrition labeling. 189 Many Commerce Clause-based regulations are
mostly about ordinary commerce, and may even have, overall, neither
significantly favorable nor significantly unfavorable effects even on
commerce. 190
Normally, close cases that do not implicate the values underlying any
fundamental constitutional or human right should take seriously the widely
GRIFFIN, supra note 182, at 193 ("We have a right to life and to some form of security of person.");
NICKEL, supra note 182, at 86; SHUE, supra note 182, at 20 ("[P]eople have a basic right to physical
security-a right that is basic not to be subjected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape, or assault."); see also
Jeremy Waldron, Security as a Basic Right (After 9/11), in GLOBAL BASIC RIGHTS 207, 211 (Charles R.
Beitz & Robert E. Goodin eds., 2009).
188. See Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
189. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2535
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2018)).
190. For a broad critique, see generally OMmI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN
YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); R. George Wright, The
Compelled Commercial Speech Cases: Why Not Just Flip a Coin?, 71 MERCER L. REv. (forthcoming
2020). For a number of entertaining examples from other areas of federal law, most with a Commerce
Clause basis, see Jason Pye, 19 Ridiculous Federal Criminal Laws and Regulations, FREEDOM WORKS
(January 14, 2016), https://www.freedomworks.org/content/19-ridiculous-federal-criminal-laws-and-
regulations [https://perma.cc/S67P-TGP2]. More broadly, see generally MIKE CHASE, HOW TO BECOME
A FEDERAL CRIMINAL: AN ILLUSTRATED HANDBOOK FOR THE ASPIRING OFFENDER (2019) (drawing
from https://twitter.com/crimeaday [https://perma.cc/PJ8P-UK6S]). Consider also whether the entirely
intrastate Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly is somehow related to the values underlying fundamental
constitutional or human rights and could not be adequately protected by the State of California. See Nagle,
supra note 162 (discussing the diverging opinions in Nat'l Assn. of Homebuilders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
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recognized values and advantages of a meaningfully federalist system. In
those close cases, the values of federalism, dispersion and decentralization
of authority, welfare efficiency, pluralism, community, local democracy, and
state-level experimentation should normally prevail. 19 1 Where no
fundamental constitutional or human right or their underlying values are
implicated in a close Commerce Clause case, the limiting values of
federalism should thus ordinarily control. 19 2
CONCLUSION
In the various close Commerce Clause cases, the courts must confront,
or more typically ignore, multiple problems of vagueness; of what kinds and
degrees of effects on interstate commerce are to be constitutionally required
in a given case; of how to meaningfully distinguish between "active" and
"passive" involvement with interstate commerce; and of when and how to
aggregate minimal effects on interstate commerce into a somehow
substantial overall effect. Until the courts can arrive at some appropriate
clarification of these constitutional uncertainties, courts are better advised to
instead direct their focus elsewhere when addressing the many close
Commerce power cases.
Specifically, courts in such cases should consider whether the case
circumstances detectably evoke a sense of the values underlying any
fundamental constitutional or human right. Violent bias-motivated attacks
present the clearest such cases, and those cases should ordinarily be held to
fall within the scope of the Commerce Clause power. Such cases afford the
courts an opportunity to at least symbolically or expressively validate, if not
to materially advance, national-level policy values of the highest order. On
the other hand, if a close Commerce Clause case evidently bears no
191. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ETAL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175-81 (8th ed. 2018); see also A.E.
Dick Howard, The Values ofFederalism, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 143 (1992); Robert P. Inman, Federalism's
Values and the Value ofFederalism (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13735, 2008).
192. While it is certainly possible that we could all be mistaken about fundamental constitutional
or human rights, epistemic humility is a virtue not only for federal decisionmakers, but for state-level
decisionmakers as well. For useful discussion, see generally Guido Calabresi & Eric S. Fish, Federalism
and Moral Disagreement, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2016). And while elements of our own proposal herein
are certainly vague, it is important to recognize that the overall consequences of vagueness may,
depending upon context, be harmful; modest; or even beneficial. The vagueness of terms such as
"fundamental constitutional rights" and "recognized constitutional rights" can, if desired, be reduced by
any authoritative listing of such rights. Persons can certainly continue to debate which rights should be
on the authoritative list, but the adopted list will not count as itself damagingly vague. Of course, referring
to such rights as "in the neighborhood," or "lurking," or being loosely suggested but not violated in a
given case invokes deliberately vague ideas. However, vagueness in this context is not only inevitable,
but deeply valuable; it distinctively sensitizes courts to the possibility of, in a proper case, symbolically
advancing the most important moral and legal values of which we know: those of recognized basic rights.
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detectable relationship to any fundamental constitutional or human right, or
to the values crucially underlying such rights, the courts should normally
accommodate instead the values and interests served by federalism, and hold
the case to fall outside the scope of the Commerce Clause power.
